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1 Introduction
The role of political institutions as the drivers of specic policy choices and more pro-
foundly, as determinants of economic development, has been the subject of intense the-
oretical and empirical investigation in recent years (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;
Boix, 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). At least since Dahl (1971), the idea that politi-
cal institutions are pivotal players in ensuring economic and social outcomes has enjoyed
widespread support. Yet, explaining how political institutions wield their inuence has re-
mained a nebulous endeavor. We know that institutions regulate the exact parameters of
citizenship rights, determining who votes and how. We know that institutions regulate the
degree of competition among factions for political power. And we know that institutions
determine the autonomy of the legislature and court system. What we dont understand
fully is how the di¤erent design of these political institutions impact economic and social
outcomes.
Crucial to building more clarity in our understanding of these fundamental issues is
the distinction between political participation and political competition. This distinc-
tion is implicitly or explicitly embodied in many denitions of democracy (e.g., Powell,
1982; Przeworsky, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000) but is also employed in analysis
of broader regime types, as demonstrated, for example, by Wintrobes work on dictator-
ships (Wintrobe, 1998). Political participation and competition also gure prominently in
theoretical research. In Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Hettich and Winer (1999), the
political inclusion of hitherto disadvantaged or disenfranchised groups is shown to increase
the demand for distributive public spending and to expand the size of government. A con-
trasting view is provided by Becker (1983) and Wittman (1989) who stress the e¢ ciency
enhancing e¤ects of political competition and the role that competition plays in limiting
the size of government.
This paper builds empirical evidence on these theoretical propositions. We show that
political participation and political competition have very di¤erent implications for the
size of government and other policy outcomes. We contribute to the existing empirical
literature, which isolates the e¤ects of either political competition or participation (e.g.,
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Husted and Kenny, 1997; Boix, 2001; Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova, 2006; Roger and
Roger, 2004; Winer and Hettich, 1988), by studying the two dimensions jointly.
The setting for our study is the particularly fecund political climate of Latin America,
where to the best of our knowledge, the e¤ects of political competition and participation of
the last eighty years have not been empirically explored. Indeed, twentieth century Latin
America provides an almost perfect laboratory for testing hypothesizes about political
institutions. For example, since independence, Peru has changed or modied its consti-
tution 13 times; Chile has modied its constitution 11 times, while Brazil and Colombia
have made 8 and 12 changes, respectively. These institutional uctuations not only reect
shifts in the allocation of voting rights and thereby the scope for political participation;
but, they indicate repeated vacillations between highly competitive democratic environ-
ments and highly autocratic or dictatorial environments with severely limited competitive
frameworks. These factors make Latin America an ideal political terrain for exploring
through statistical assessment the impact of electoral participation and competition on
scal outcomes.
Our study is two-pronged, rst estimating the impact of di¤erent competitive and
participatory frameworks on scal expenditures and the size of government. Our second
objective shows the impact of electoral literacy requirements and womens su¤rage limita-
tions on both scal outcomes and general educational attainment. In such highly complex
political environments, we believe it is critical to attempt to understand not only the ef-
fects of political institutions on government size and spending indicators, but also on social
factors, such as education attainment, which so clearly feedback into the political process.
We believe exploring the outcome of these transitions statistically makes contributions to
the debate, and provokes urgent questions about institutional and electoral design. But we
acknowledge the importance of peculiar, local specicities (Rodrik, 2005) demonstrated in
the histories of the 18 countries we study.
Literacy requirements were the most obdurate of Latin American electoral restric-
tions. By the late 19th century, most countries in Latin America were at least nominally
democracies, but with much more restricted voting franchise requirements than, for ex-
ample, the USA and Canada (Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2001). Restrictions could include
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wealth or income requirements, but most frequently, laws contained literacy qualications.
While most wealth or income requirements were abolished in the late 19th and early 20th
century, literacy requirements remained in place in some countries until the 1980s (En-
german, Mariscal and Sokolo¤, 1998). In countries such as Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador,
which have sizable, predominant Native American populations with high levels of illiteracy,
these restrictions likely served the purpose of keeping an elite in control, and excluding
the massive marginalized population from political inuence. In a political climate of such
divisive restrictions, we build statistical explanations to show the impact of literacy tests
on education attainment. We also seek to show how literacy tests restricting the franchise
e¤ected scal outcomes.
Su¤rage restrictions also excluded vast portions of the population from the electoral
process well into the 20th century. The rst country to grant women the right to vote
was Ecuador in 1929, followed by Uruguay and Brazil in 1932. Nearly three decades later,
Paraguay followed suit in 1961. Restrictions on female participation in the political process
in other contexts, e.g., the USA (Lott and Kenny, 1999) and Western Europe (Aidt and
Dallal, 2006) have been found to a¤ect scal outcomes. We examine if similar patterns
can be found in Latin America.
Our analysis is based on an (unbalanced) panel data set with information on scal out-
comes (for central government) and educational attainment in 18 Latin American coun-
tries1 for the period 1920 to 2000. We employ the Polity IV index to measure political
competition (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000), and turnout in elections and referenda to mea-
sure political participation (Vanhanen, 2000 and 2003b). The choices allow us to track
political reforms over long periods of time and exploit the often substantial variation in
political participation and competition within the 18 Latin American countries. Many
studies, e.g., Boix (2001, chapter 5), Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Persson
and Tabellini (2006), use a "world" sample that includes as many countries as possible.
We believe that the focus on a sample of Latin American countries has one main advantage
1The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and
Panama.
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compared to previous work in the literature. Despite inter-country di¤erences, a sample
of Latin American countries is signicantly more homogenous than a "world" sample.
We draw four main conclusions from our analysis. First, our xed e¤ect estimates
strongly support the hypothesis that political participation and competition have opposite
e¤ects on the size of government. A country that instigates reforms enhancing political
competition experiences a fall in government expenditure and taxation in percentage of
GDP in the order of 1.7-2.0 percentage points. In contrast, a country that, through
franchise reform or otherwise, experiences an increase of 50 per cent of the population in
election participation, subsequently witnesses an increase in government expenditure and
taxation as a percentage of GDP by approximately 2.0-2.3 percentage points.
Second, we nd indirect evidence that part of the reduction in the size of government
associated with enhanced political competition can be attributed to a reduction in spend-
ing on securing and maintaining authority. In short, in environments bereft of political
competition, we suggest direct costs are incurred to the government by the elites attempt
to maintain power and control, be it through military or policing measures. Once a more
pluralistic, competitive political environment is achieved, the costs of repression diminish.
Third, we nd that much of the increase in government size due to heightened political
participation can be attributed to reforms which eliminate literacy tests. Womens su¤rage,
in contrast, appears to have no signicant impact on the size of government.
Fourth, investigating the impact of both political competition and participation proves
highly indicative of school enrollment patterns. In particular, we nd that franchise reforms
removing literacy tests result in increased enrollment in primary education and reductions
in enrollment in secondary and tertiary education. Womens su¤rage has the opposite
e¤ect, spurring decreased enrollment in primary education and increased enrollment in
secondary and tertiary education. Political competition a¤ects enrollment in primary
schools positively.
In sum, we show that political participation and political competition have very dif-
ferent implications for the size of government and scal expenditure. We extend current
literatures by providing a new approach, analyzing the e¤ects of participation and compe-
tition coterminously. We add fodder to the debate regarding the relevance of the electoral
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and political environment to educational structures, showing that franchise e¤ects enroll-
ment levels.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the distinction between
political competition and participation, deriving testable implications from theoretical
literatures and discussing how we obtain operational measures of political competition
and participation. In Section 3, we present our data on the size of government, discuss the
econometric specication, and present the main results. In section 4, we rene our measure
of political participation by explicitly incorporating franchise reforms (removal of literacy
tests and womens su¤rage) into the analysis. We study the consequences not only for the
size of government, but also for enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education.
In Section 5, we briey discuss other results that emerge from the analysis. In Section 6,
we provide concluding remarks. The Data Appendix contains a detailed discussion of data
and sources. All tables and diagrams are presented at the end of the paper.
2 Political Competition and Participation: Theory
and Measurement
The anatomy of political systems has been dissected in varied denitions. Some authors
stress the contrasting characteristics of democracies and autocracies (or dictatorships)
(e.g., Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000; Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin,
2004). Others focus on di¤erences in the details of political institutions within these
broad categories. For example, Wintrobe (1998) identies and analyzes distinct types of
dictatorship, while Persson and Tabellini (2003) compare democracies that use di¤erent
election rules or democracies that can be classied as either parliamentarian or presidential.
Husted and Kenny (1997) and Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006) study the allocation
of voting rights and the extension of the franchise, while Mueller and Stratmann (2003)
focus on di¤erences in voter turnout rates in democratic elections.
A common idea motivating all these classications is that institutional arrangements
create incentives for political leaders which not only lead to particular policy choices, but
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also provide di¤erent incentives for agents in the private sector. This, in turn, becomes an
important determinant of the development path of a society and the welfare levels attained.
Dahl (1971) made an important distinction between varying dimensions of democracy, two
of which we call political "competition" and "participation".2 This theory suggests that
political institutions create incentives by fostering or hindering political competition and
participation. By political competition we mean the extent to which political power is,
in fact, freely contested by political parties, pressure groups or other organized factions
within a dened political structure. Finally, in an environment of political competition the
legislature enjoys autonomy. Political participation, in contrast, is related to the rights of
citizens to participate in the selection of their government and the extent to which they
exercise this right.
Both conceptually and empirically, it is important to consider political arrangements
or regimes along participatory and competitive dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates how a
participatory-competitive analytical approach can be used to classify political regimes.
Societies with universal su¤rage, high electoral turnout, and multi-party elections are lo-
cated to the Northeast and characterized by a high degree of both political competition
and participation. Examples of in this category include Argentina, 1873-75; Costa Rica,
1949-2000; and Mexico, 1994-2000. Societies in which the government is controlled by one
faction and most citizens are barred from participating in the selection of that govern-
ment are located to the Southwest. Examples of this include Brazil, 1900-1930; Venezuela,
1920-45; and Guatemala, 1931-43. Societies with a one-party state, but "nominal" elec-
tions based on comprehensive su¤rage rights are located to the Northwest. Examples
include Paraguay, 1961-88; Mexico, 1953-93; and Panama, 1983-87. Societies with re-
stricted su¤rage, but competition within the elite for political power are located to the
Southeast. Examples include Argentina, 1890-1911; Chile, 1940-48; and Peru, 1942-54.
[Figure 1: Classication of Political Regimes.].
2Dahl (1971) used the terms "public contestation" and "right to participate," but we prefer to fol-
low Vanhanen (2000) and use the terms "political competition" and "political participation". A third
dimension of democracy highlighted by Dahl (1971) is civil liberties.
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Political Competition The e¤ect of political competition on policy choices is normally
conceptualized within the context of spatial voting models (Downs, 1957; Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987) or pressure group models (Becker, 1983). Two-party competition produces
a strong pull towards the median position in simple Downsian models and can, under some
circumstances, lead to Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium outcomes when voter preferences have
a stochastic ideological component (Hettich and Winer, 1999, chapter 4; Coughlin and
Nitzan, 1981). Wittman (1989, 1995), Becker (1983, 1985) and others further stress the
e¢ ciency enhancing e¤ects of political competition. Becker (1983), for example, argues
that competition among pressure groups for and against redistribution leads to e¢ cient
methods of taxation because political pressure in favor of tax instruments with high dead-
weight costs is relatively low, while opposition is strong. Ferejohn (1986), Polo (1998) and
others point to the fact that political competition constraints the ability of politicians to
extract rents. In short, there is a strong presumption that political competition is asso-
ciated with more e¢ cient government. Although it does not necessary follow from this
that political competition leads to less government spending and lower levels of taxation,
there are at least four reasons why enhanced political competition is likely to produce this
outcome.
First, scal illusion induces systematic misperception of the costs and benets of gov-
ernment spending and leads to an upwards bias in public spending (Buchanan andWagner,
1977). As pointed out by West and Winer (1980), this e¤ect is, however, mitigated by po-
litical competition. In a competitive environment, opposition parties and pressure groups
have an incentive to gather information and make it available to voters. The degree of
informational openness decreases the extent of scal illusion and suggests one channel
through which political competition may reduce government spending. Second, enhanced
political competition allows more pressure groups to be catered for in the political calculus
(Mueller and Murrel, 1986). Subsidy recipients have a comparative advantage in organiz-
ing collective action because they, typically, are few in numbers and the benets bestowed
are concentrated (Olson, 1965). An increase in political competition is, therefore, often
equivalent to empowerment of taxpayers and, as shown in Aidt (2003), an increase in po-
litical competition is, for this reason, likely to lead to a reduction in government sponsored
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redistribution. Third, political competition enhances political accountability (e.g., Fere-
john, 1986; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997). Among other things, enhanced political
competition means that power can be contested more freely. As new challengers present
themselves, this provides citizens with alternatives to the incumbent and it becomes pos-
sible to reduce o¢ ce rents and other ine¢ ciencies. The outcome of this is likely to be
lower taxation. Fourth, in societies with severe restrictions on political competition (e.g.,
in a dictatorship) political leaders need to spend substantial public funds on securing and
maintaining power (Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Consequently, spending levels
tend to be high relative to societies with more competitive political institutions.
Political Participation The e¤ect of political participation on the scal system can
best be analyzed within the framework of the probabilistic voting model (Hettich and
Winer, 1988, 1999).3 The equilibrium scal structure reects a trade-o¤ between the
loss and gain of political support from groups of voters. By lifting property or income
restrictions on the right to vote, individuals with lower incomes or less wealth are granted
political voice, and the constituency of government is expanded with new voters who are
poor relative to the average taxpayer. The Representation Theorem4, then, predicts that
an extension of the franchise increases the demand for redistribution (Tridimas and Winer,
2005).5 Moreover, political parties are less likely to attach the same weight to groups of
voters who normally do not show up to vote as they do to voters with a more predictable
turnout pattern. There is substantial evidence from many di¤erent countries that richer
and better educated citizens are more likely to exercise their right to vote than their poorer
and uneducated counterparts.6 It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that an expansion
3The question is sometimes posed within the context of the median voter model (e.g., Meltzer and
Richard, 1981; Boix, 2001). However, since scal systems are inherited multi-dimensional and complex,
the empirical relevance of predictions from this type of model is somewhat limited.
4The Representation Theorem shows that the equilibrium platform can be characterized by optimizing
a particular weighted sum of the enfranchised voters utilities (Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Hettich and
Winer, 1999, chapter 4).
5Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Boix (2003, chapter 1), in their theories of the why the voting
franchise was extended, build on this argument, while Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that universal
su¤rage is associated with more spending on public goods because it is cheaper for politicians to please a
broad constituency in this way.
6See Norris (2001) or the discussion in Mueller and Stratmann (2003).
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of actual political participation (turnout) also leads to more spending and higher taxation
because any increase mostly reects an increase in participation of poorer and less educated
strata of society. All in all, this suggests that an increase in political participation leads
to more spending and higher taxation.7
Measurement The theoretical reasons why political competition and participation have
opposite scal e¤ects are compelling. To establish the empirical relevance, we need to
nd separate operational indicators of the two dimensions.8 Among the many alternative
indicators that have been proposed in the literature, we have settled on two that e¤ectively
and accurately capture the two dimensions we are interested in.
First, political participation is relatively straightforward to measure, either as the num-
ber of eligible voters (e.g., Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006) or Lindert (2004, vol. 2))
or as the number of voters who actually vote in elections or referenda (e.g., Mueller and
Stratmann, 2003). We use the later denition, mainly because data is available from
Vanhanens Polyarchy database (Vanhanen, 2000 and 2003b), but also because, for this
purpose, it is better to use a measure of actual rather than potential participation. More
precisely, the participation index is an aggregate of voter turnout in general elections and
in referenda, in proportion to the total population, which takes the value of 0 when there
are no elections or referenda to participate in.9 In section 4, we rene the measure of
political participation by explicitly incorporating two important restrictions on the right
to participate related to literacy requirements and the exclusion of women.
Second, to measure political competition, we use the Polity IV index developed by Mar-
shall and Jaggers (2000). The Polity IV index comprises a composite index of democracy
and autocracy and has, in a number of recent studies, e.g., Avelino, Brown and Hunter
(2005), Rodrik and Warcziarg (2004), Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Lopez-
Cordova and Meisner (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005), and Persson (2005),
7This is, however, not inevitable. As shown by Aidt, Daunton and Dutta (2006), an extension of the
franchise can in some cases lead to retrenchment rather than to expansion.
8Alternatively, we could look for comprehensive indices of, say, democracy, such as those employed by
Boix (2003, chapter 2) and Vanhanen (2000, 2003b), that combine aspects of competition and participa-
tion. While such indices are useful for many purposes they would not allow us to identify the separate
impact of political competition and participation.
9See the Data Appendix for a precise denition.
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been used as an indicator of democracy, as a tool to classify political regimes (democracy
versus autocracy), or as a tool to dene episodes of democratization. A closer look at
the denition of the index, however, suggests, as also noted by Vanhanen (2000), that it
should be viewed as an indicator of political competition rather than as an indicator of
democracy or autocracy per se.
The ve underlying authority characteristics on which the Polity IV index is based are:
i) competitiveness of executive recruitment: the extent to which executives are chosen
through competitive elections; ii) openness of executive recruitment: the opportunity for
non-elites to attain executive o¢ ce; iii) executive constraints: the operational (de facto)
independent of chief executive; iv) regulation of participation: the development of institu-
tional structures for political expression such as enduring national political organizations
and e¤ective regime controls on political activity; v) competitiveness of participation: the
extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the
political arena. All these characteristics clearly relate to salient features of political com-
petition and none of them are directly related to the extension of the franchise or to turnout
in elections, i.e., they are unrelated to political participation.
A number of other measures of political competition has been proposed in the literature.
Vanhanen (2000, 2003b) measures competition by the share of votes captured by "small"
parties in parliamentarian elections, while Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) and Rogers and
Rogers (2000) use the "win-margin" of the incumbent governor as a measure of competition
and Skilling and Zeckhauser (2002) focus on the length of time a party has been in o¢ ce.
All these measures have merits, but they often start from the presumption that some basic
democratic structures are in place and they are not invariant to the choice of election rule
and do not account well for party structure (Vanhanen, 2000). For these reasons, we
believe that the Polity IV index is a better measure of political competition, in particular
when we are interested in the evolution of political competition over long time periods
and across di¤erent societies. The Polity IV index is coded from -10 (restricted political
competition) to +10 (unrestricted political competition). For descriptive purposes, it is
convenient to normalize the index to lay between 0 and 1.
11
[Figure 2: Scatter plot of the (normalized) Polity IV index and the participation index]
[Figure 3a   c: The (normalized) Polity IV index and the participation index, 1920-
2000, in three selected countries]
Figure 2 shows a simple scatter plot of the two indicators with the Polity IV index,
normalized to be between 0 to 1, on the x-axis and the participation index on the y-axis.
As one would expect, the two indicators are positively correlated (with a correlation coef-
cient of about 0.45). More importantly, however, for each level of political competition,
political participation varies substantially. Conversely, a given level of participation can
be associated with very di¤erent levels of political competition.
The distinction between participation and competition can also be seen by considering
individual countries. For example, throughout the 20th century, Costa Ricas political
system was highly competitive with a "perfect" score of 1 on the normalized Polity IV
index. As we can see from Figure 3a, which plots the normalized Polity IV index and
the participation index over time, this outcome was achieved both in year 1900 when
political participation was minimum and in year 2000 when 40 percent of the population
participated in elections. Thus, neither the enfranchisement of illiterates in 1913, nor of
women in 1949 had any impact on Costa Ricas Polity IV score.
Mexico is another interesting example (see Figure 3b). During the period 1910-30,
political participation was increasing, while more restrictions were imposed on political
competition. This was followed by a long period of increasing political participation (in-
cluding womens su¤rage in 1953), but without any liberalization of political competition,
manifesting itself in the fact that almost all the elections during this period were won by
the same party. Brazil provides an example where the two dimensions move in tandem
(see Figure 3c). Yet, a convincing case can be made that the two indicators are, indeed,
capturing two di¤erent aspects of institutional development.
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3 Political Competition, Participation and the Size of
Government
To assess the impact of political competition and political participation on the size of the
public sector, we have constructed a panel data set covering 18 Latin American countries
during the period 1920-2000.10 We believe that this has several advantages compared
to previous work in the literature. First, many studies, e.g., Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) and Boix (2003, chapter 5), focus on a "world" sample that includes as
many countries as possible. Despite inter-country di¤erences, a sample of Latin American
countries is more homogenous than a world sample, making the homogeneity assumption
required to justify a panel (or cross country) approach more tenable. Secondly, as we
discuss in more detail below, the panel structure allows us to reduce the risk of omitted
variables bias.
3.1 The Size of the Public Sector: Some Facts
We are interested in testing the proposition that political competition reduces the size of
the public sector, while political participation is associated with an expansion. Ideally, we
want to study the combined size of central, regional and local government. Data on general
government spending is, however, not available for a su¢ ciently long time period, so all
scal variables are for central government. We use two indicators of the size of (central)
government: 1) public spending (G=Y ) and 2) tax revenues (T=Y ), both measured as a
percentage of GDP (Y ). In addition, to these broad indicators of the size of government, we
study the impact of political competition and participation on the sources of government
revenue. In particular, we look at 1) income tax revenues (T income=Y ), 2) commodity tax
revenues (T commodity=Y ) and 3) tari¤ revenues (T tariff=Y ), all measured as a percentage of
GDP. We are also interested in the resources devoted to maintenance of internal security.
We do not have scal data that measure this directly, so we use data on the number
10The 18 countries are listed in Table 1. The panel is unbalanced. Appendix Table A1 provides
information about the time period covered for each country. For some countries data is available from
1900. However, for the purpose of the regression analysis, the sample starts in 1920 when data for more
than three countries become available.
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of soldiers as a percentage of the total population aged between 16 and 59 years old
(soldiers per capita aged 16-59 ) and data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP
(Gdefense=Y ) as proxies. These data are only available since 1960 and 1973, respectively.
[Table 1: The size of government in the 18 countries, selected time periods].
Table 1 provides information about the size of government in the 18 countries during
the period 1920-2000. As in other parts of the world, the size of government, both in terms
of expenditures and revenues, is increasing as the century progresses. At the beginning
of the century average spending (and taxation) was less than 10 per cent of GDP; at the
end, it was about 19 per cent. This general trend hides interesting country di¤erences. In
Brazil, for example, the central government controlled almost 30 per cent of GDP during
the 1990s, only surpassed by Nicaragua who spent almost 50 per cent of GDP at the height
of the civil war in the 1980s. In contrast, Guatemala and Paraguay ran relatively small
governments.
[Figure 4: The size of government (G=Y and T=Y ) 1920-2000, distinguishing by the
degree of political participation and competition]
Figure 4 shows four scatter plots of government expenditure and revenue, relative to
GDP, over time (1920-2000). In panel A, we divide the data points into those that represent
a situation with restricted political competition (indicated with bold circles) and those that
represent a situation with unrestricted political competition (indicated with crosses). We
dene political competition as restricted if the Polity IV index is negative and unrestricted
otherwise. Likewise, in panel B, we divide the data points according to the level of political
participation. Political participation is low (indicated with bold circles) if less than 15 per
cent of the population participate in the selection of their government and high (indicated
with crosses) otherwise. The upwards trend in both expenditure and revenue is apparent
for all categories. More interesting, however, is the observation that countries with either
a highly competitive political system or limited political participation tend to have smaller
governments. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions discussed above, but needs,
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of course, to be treated with caution; to get more robust insights, we should to turn to a
proper regression analysis.
3.2 The Econometric Specication
We estimate the following model:
yit = i + t + 1x
participation
it + 2x
competition
it + x
control
it  + "it (1)
where yit is the outcome variable of interest in country i at time t and "it is the error term
with E("it) = 0. The variable x
participation
it is the participation index introduced above
and xcompetitionit is a measure of political competition based on the Polity IV index. Since
the Polity IV index is recorded on an ordinal scale, we prefer to use a dummy variable
to measure the degree of political competition rather than entering the index directly in
the regression model. In particular, we dene a dummy variable competition dummy 
that takes the value of 1 when the Polity IV index is positive and the value of 0 when the
index is negative.11 This variable, therefore, measures the impact of political competition
vis-a-vis a counterfactual of "restricted political competition".
Fiscal choices are a¤ected by many other factors than political participation and com-
petition. We include the vector xcontrolit of time-varying control variables to take some of
these into account.12 First, the variable urbanization rate measures the proportion of the
population who lives in urban areas. Urbanization is highly correlated with industrializa-
tion and economic and social progress factors which in themselves are likely to a¤ect the
tax structure and which through the processes discussed by Wagner (1883) should increase
the need for public services and for regulation of economic activity.
Second, the age composition of the population may also have an impact on the size
of government because of changing needs for social services (such as pensions and public
health). In particular, Lindert (1994) shows that ageing of the population contributed
11We obtain essentially identical results if we entered the Polity IV index directly in the regression
model.
12A precise denition and the source of each variable is given in the Data Appendix.
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signicantly to the rise of social spending in Europe and the USA during the period 1880-
1930, and we would, thus, expect the proportion of old to a¤ect the size of government
positively. We include the percentage of the population aged 60 or above, population
over 60, to allow for this possibility. Third, we include an estimate of PPP adjusted
GDP per capita in logarithms, GDP per capita, to control for business cycle e¤ects and
the growth rate of GDP per capita, growth, to proxy for general development trends.
Fourth, Rodrik (1998) has argued that openness to international trade is associated with
larger government spending because a larger public sector reduces economic volatility and
provides insurance. We include the variable trade openness, which is dened as export
plus import in percentage of GDP, to allow for this possibility. Fifth, some public services
are provided with increasing return to scale. We allow for scale e¤ects by including the
variable, population, which records the logarithm of the population in millions. Sixth,
inequality of income and wealth play an important role in many theories of public nance.
Standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini-coe¢ cient, are unavailable for most of
the sample period. As a proxy for income equality, we use the percentage of the total area
of cultivated land that is owned by family farmers (Vanhanen, 2003a). We believe this is
a reasonable proxy in our context. Finally, war and economic crisis can have signicant
scal e¤ects and we include a dummy variable to control for economic crises (economic
crisis) and a dummy variable to control for war (war). We also include the rate of ination
(ination) to capture the scal implications of episodes of high ination.
The model includes country xed e¤ects (i) and year xed e¤ects (t). This speci-
cation rules out that the inference regarding the two parameters of interest (1 and 2)
are contaminated by unobserved determinants of scal choices that are constant over time
(country xed e¤ects) or a¤ect all countries at a given point in time in the same way (year
xed e¤ects). This reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of omitted variables bias and
implies that we are using "within" variation (i.e., variation in political arrangements within
a given country over time) to identify the impact of political participation and competition
on scal choices. In e¤ect, we are seeking an answer to the question: if a given country
experienced an increase in political participation (or competition), then, allowing for other
potential determinants of the countrys scal choices, what would we expect the change in
16
scal policy to be.
We estimate the model with a xed e¤ects estimator allowing for panel-specic standard
errors and correlations between panel units, as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995).13 ;14
We have tested the stationarity of the data using the Fisher Test for panel unit roots
and can in each case reject the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary for
all panel units. However, since we do not model dynamics explicitly, we are worried
about autocorrelation in the residuals and correct for autocorrelation of order one in all
regressions and include a deterministic time trend in each regression.
3.3 Results
The Main Results The main results are reported in Table 2. Regressions (1) and (2)
provide strong support the hypothesis that political competition reduces the size of gov-
ernment, both measured in terms of revenue and in terms of expenditures, while political
participation increases the size. A country that experiences an increase in political com-
petition (from low to high) would see a fall in public expenditure of about 2 percentage
points and a fall in tax revenues of about 1:7 percentage point. In contrast, a country that
experiences an increase in political participation from a situation with no participation
to a situation in which 50 percent of the population participate in the selection of their
government would see an increase in public expenditures of about 2:3 percentage points
and an increase in total tax revenues of about 1:9 percentage points.
Bearing in mind that average spending (and taxation) as a percentage of GDP is about
15.2 (and 13.4) per cent, these e¤ects are relatively substantial. Regressions (3) to (5) re-
port the results for di¤erent types of revenue. We notice that political competition reduces
tax revenues from commodity taxes and tari¤s, while political participation increases tax
revenues raised through income taxation. Given that income taxes tend to be better suited
for redistribution than commodity and trade taxes, this is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that an increase in political participation, e.g., through enfranchisement of the poor,
13The estimates are performed in Stata version 8.2.
14We have also estimated a random e¤ects model. In the few cases where it passes the Hausman test,
the results are similar to the xed e¤ects model and we only report the results from the latter model.
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is associated with more redistribution. The negative impact of political competition on
revenues from tari¤s and commodity taxes is consistent with the notion that political
competition promotes more e¢ cient forms of taxation.
As discussed in section 2, one reason why societies with limited political competition
tend to run relatively large (central) governments is that substantial public funds must be
devoted to securing and maintaining the political status quo. We can test this hypoth-
esis, albeit only indirectly, by looking at the impact of political competition on the size
of the army (soldiers per capita 16-59 ) and on the fraction of GDP devoted to defense
(Gdefense=Y ). The result of this test is reported in regressions (8) and (9) in Table 2. For
comparison, we have reestimated the regressions for total government spending and rev-
enue as a percentage of GDP for the appropriate time periods (regressions (6) and (7)).15
We see that the hypothesis receives support. A society that experiences an increase in po-
litical competition sees a reduction in the size of its army and a reduction in the proportion
of GDP devoted to defence. This suggests that political competition reduces the size of
government partly because it frees up resources that would otherwise have to be invested
in internal (and external) security. In contrast, political participation is not statistically
signicant.
Interaction E¤ects Our baseline model assumes that political competition and political
participation have independent e¤ects on scal choices. One might, however, conjecture
that the impact of, say, womens su¤rage representing a substantial increase in (potential)
political participation on the size of government is very di¤erent in a society with limited
political competition as compared to a society with competitive political institutions. For
one thing, the preferences of newly enfranchised women might not be represented in the
political calculus unless political factions or parties compete for their votes. Likewise, it
is possible, as argued by Besley, Persson and Sturm (2006), that franchise reforms can, by
themselves, induce more political competition.16
15While the signs are preserved, the e¤ects are not statistically signicant with the exception of political
competition in regression (7). This is not surprising as we lose much of the "within" variation by shorting
the sample period by 40 years.
16Besley, Persson and Sturm (2006) show that the removal of literary tests and the poll tax from the
laws that governed political participation in the US south in the 1960s helped break the near monopoly
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To allow for such possibilities, we have included an interaction term (interaction) be-
tween competition and participation in the regression model. The regressions include the
same control variables as in Table 2, but to conserve space, we only report the results
for the variables of interest in Table 3. We see from regressions (10) and (11) that the
interaction term is insignicant in both the expenditure and taxation regression and that
the point estimates on the competition dummy and the participation index are virtually
una¤ected. With regard to the three di¤erent sources of revenue, we note that the in-
teraction e¤ect is signicant only in the regression with income tax revenues. The point
estimate on the interaction term is positive, suggesting complementarity between political
competition and participation in promoting income taxation. In particular, we note that
an increase in political competition reduces income tax revenues in a country with limited
political participation (participation index less than 12.7 per cent) while in a country with
high levels of participation (participation index larger than 12.7 per cent) an increase in
political competition increases income tax revenues. Overall, however, the results reported
in Table 3 suggest that complementarity between the two dimensions is not very impor-
tant and that we loose little by studying the impact of the two dimensions of political
institutions separately.
Comparison with Previous Studies The main contribution of our analysis so far is to
demonstrate that both political competition and political participation exercise important
inuences on the size of government, but pull in opposite directions. In contrast, most
of the existing empirical work on the link between scal choices and political competition
and participation focuses on one aspect in isolation.
The literature that studies the link between political competition and the size of gov-
ernment is not conclusive, although many studies do point in the direction of a negative
relationship. Using data from U.S. states, Rogers and Rogers (2000) present evidence
that increases in political competition, measured by the "win-margin" of the incumbent
governor, decreases state government spending. For the OECD countries, Skilling and
Zeckhauser (2002) nd that political competition, measured as the length of time the gov-
of the Democratic party with important ramications for economic development.
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erning party or parties have been in o¢ ce, improves the primary balance, mainly through
a reduction in the growth of spending. In contrast, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) show
that political competition17 increases the size of US state government, through an increase
in Medicare generosity and in disability protection.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of the Polity IV index on scal
outcomes and are, thus, more directly comparable to ours. Aidt and Jensen (2006) and
Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006) nd in various panels of Western European countries
during the period between 1860 and 1938 that political competition has an asymmetric
e¤ect on the government budget: enhanced competition reduces expenditure but increases
taxation. One interpretation of this is that political competition has the e¤ect of closing
the gap between expenditures and revenues.
The evidence from broader samples is more mixed. Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) study a cross section of more than 100 countries and report that political compe-
tition18 has little impact on government consumption, education spending, pensions, and
non-pension social spending. Instead, the di¤erences seem to arise with respect to policies
that a¤ect the degree of competition for public o¢ ce, presumable because political lead-
ers, to limit competition, need to make investments in securing and maintaining power.
The last result is in line with our ndings. Persson and Tabellini (2006) study a panel
of about 150 countries over the period 1960-2000 and nd that the e¤ect on government
spending of reforms that enhance political competitive19 depends on the type of election
rule and on the form of government. In particular, in an environment with majority rule
and presidential democracy enhanced political competition reduces government spending
by almost 2 per cent of GDP. The opposite is true in an environment with parliamentarian
democracy.
The literature on political participation and the size of government paints a clearer
picture that is consistent with our ndings. One branch of the literature has studied the
17Political competition is measured as a composite of four factors: i) the percentage of the popular vote
won by the winning candidate, ii) the margin of victory, iii) whether the seat was safe and iv) if the race
was contested or not.
18They interpret the Polity IV index as a measure of democracy.
19They use the polity2 index from the Polity IV data set and use the terminology that a country is
democratic if the polity2 index is strictly positive.
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impact of franchise reforms on scal choices. Husted and Kenny (1997) draw on a panel
of 46 U.S. states, nding that an extension of the voting franchise through the removal
of income restrictions and literacy tests increases social spending substantially and leads
to a modest increase in total government spending. Along similar lines, Aidt, Dutta
and Loukoianova (2006) nd that the extension of the franchise in Western Europe before
World War II contributed to the growth in the size of the government mainly by increasing
spending on infrastructure and internal security. Another strand of the literature, which
studies the impact of electoral turnout on scal choices, has found similar results. For
example, Mueller and Stratmann (2003) nd, using a world sample, that higher electoral
participation is associated with larger governments and through this, with lower income
inequality. Boix (2001, 2003, chapter 5) also studies, using a world sample, the e¤ect of
electoral turnout on scal choices. Boix is careful to separate the e¤ect of turnout from the
e¤ect of having competitive democracy. He nds that political participation increases the
size of government, and that the e¤ect increases with the level of economic development.
4 Womens Su¤rage and Literacy Tests
In this section, we look deeper into the reasons why political participation, as shown
above, is positively associated with the size of government. We also ask how particular
restrictions, such as literacy tests, a¤ect education attainment.
Political participation can be enhanced or hindered by variations in legal restrictions on
the right to vote. During the 20th century, two of the most common restrictions employed
by Latin American countries were literacy tests and exclusion of women.20 Virtually all the
Latin American countries adopted a literacy requirement for citizenship (which included
the right to vote) in their rst constitution or soon thereafter. As illustrated by Table
4, which reports the dates at which literacy tests were abolished in each country, these
persisted in some, but not all, countries for long periods of time. The extreme cases are
Brazil, Chile and Peru, where these restrictions played an important role until the 1970s
20Literacy requirements had by the turn of the 19th century replaced wealth or income requirements
as a means to keep Native Americans and other poor people from voting in most countries in the sample.
For this reason, we do not attempt to identify the impact of wealth and income restrictions.
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and the 1980s. In a few other countries, e.g., Argentina and Colombia, literacy tests were
never applied systematically at the national level (Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2001). Table 4
also reports when womens su¤rage was granted in the 18 countries. It happened within
the time window from 1929 (Ecuador) to 1955 (Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru), so until
then, voting rights, and with it the right to participate in the selection of government,
were restricted to (literate and/or wealthy) men.
[Table 4: The timing of womens su¤rage and the abolishment of literacy tests in the
18 countries.]
4.1 The Size of Government
Reforms that enfranchise women or illiterate citizens increase the potential for political
participation.21 Lott and Kenny (1999) argue that womens su¤rage is associated with
larger government. One reason for this is that married women who have specialized in
household production, in case of break down of marriage or widowhood, may nd it di¢ cult
to enter or reenter the labor market. They may, therefore, support spending on publicly
provided private goods, such as health and education, that provide a form of insurance
against unexpected employment and household disruptions. Another reason is that a
demand for social services naturally arises as women seek to shift part of the burden of
household chores, such as child care, onto the state (see, e.g., Cavalcanti and Tavares,
2006).
Literacy restrictions, on the other hand, were used systematically to exclude indigenous
populations from voting. The e¤ective disenfranchisement of a large fraction of mainly
poor citizens in all likelihood, reduced the demand for redistributive public spending in
general and may have discouraged elites from investing in public education in particular.
In conclusion, there exist compelling theoretical reasons why both womens su¤rage and
franchise reforms that remove literacy tests should be associated with an increase in the
21We ran a regression of electoral participation on womens and illiterate su¤rage together with our
control variables. We nd signicant evidence of a positive correlation between voter turnout and womens
su¤rage and enfranchisement of illiterate people.
22
size of government.
To test this hypothesis, we construct a new set of variables. We begin by coding the
dummy variable, participation dummy, as 1 in year t in country i if the participation index
is positive, i.e., there is some participation in either elections or referenda, and 0 otherwise.
Next, we code the dummy variable, womens su¤rage, as 1 in year t in country i if the
participation index is positive at the time and women were allowed to vote. Finally, we
construct the variable literacy e¤ect in two steps. First, we code a dummy variable as 1 in
year t in country i if the participation index is positive and the right to vote is unrelated
to any literacy test. Second, we multiply this dummy variable with the share of the
population who is illiterate. In this way, the literacy e¤ect captures the potential political
inuence of the group of illiterate voters.22 We note that womens su¤rage and literacy
e¤ect are designed to measure the impact of literacy and gender restrictions on the size of
government conditional on some political participation and that the participation dummy
is designed to capture the e¤ect of having some participation among literate men.23 We
estimate a panel model similar to equation (1), except that we now include four political
variables, competition dummy, participation dummy, literacy e¤ect and womens su¤rage.
[Table 5: Literacy tests, womens su¤rage, the size of government and enrollment in
education].
We report the results in Table 5, regressions (15) and (16). First, we notice that
womens su¤rage does not have any statistically signicant impact on the size of gov-
ernment. This stands in contrast to ndings by Lott and Kenny (1999) who show that
womens su¤rage increased total spending across US states during the period 1860-1940.
The nding is, however, in line with results from Western Europe before World War II.
Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006) nd that womens su¤rage had little impact total
government spending in a sample of 12 Western European countries, although it did con-
22One could argue that we, for consistency, should multiply womens su¤rage by the share of adult
women. We have tried this and it makes no di¤erence to the results.
23This formulation assumes that voting rights granted in the past under a spell of democratic elections
do not a¤ect policy outcomes in subsequent periods without any participation. This seems reasonable. We
have checked if it makes a di¤erence if the two dummy variables were coded 1 after the relevant restriction
were lifted irrespective of subsequent regime changes and the results are very similar.
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tribute to the rise of social spending (Lindert, 1994; Aidt and Dallal, 2006) and increased
the share of direct taxes (Aidt and Jensen, 2006). The result is also broadly in line with
the conclusions of Stutzer and Kienast (2004) who explore di¤erences in the timing of the
introduction of womens su¤rage in the Cantons of Switzerland and nd little association
between womens su¤rage and social spending at the Canton level and a negative impact
on total spending. In contrast, Abrams and Settle (1999) nd a large positive impact on
social welfare spending in Switzerland after voting rights were granted to women in 1971.
Second, abolishment of the literacy test increases both government expenditures and
revenues as a percentage of GDP. Evaluated at the mean of the sample, the size of this
e¤ect is between 0:9 and 1:4 percentage points.24 This suggests that the positive e¤ect
on the size of government reported in Table 2 is driven largely by the enfranchisement
and participation of illiterate citizens. This empirical outcome is consistent with theory
insofar as literacy tests excluded relatively poor voters who, when given the vote, would
use their inuence to support redistributive policies, leading to the increase in the size of
government.25 The only other study we are aware of that investigates the e¤ect of literacy
tests on public spending is Husted and Kenny (1997). They report the literacy tests in
(some) US states (1950-88) reduced welfare spending, but in contrast to the evidence
presented here, the e¤ect is relatively weak and certainly less important than the poll tax.
The importance of the literacy test in Latin America motivates our next line of inquiry:
do literacy tests a¤ect education outcomes?
4.2 Education Outcomes
Publicly funded education commands a central role in many development theories (e.g.,
Lucas, 1988; Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2006). Both political competition and restrictions
on political participation are likely to a¤ect the ow of funds into public education, the
enrollment rates in di¤erent types of education and ultimately, the shape of the educational
24The average illiteracy rate in the sample is 30 percent.
25We may also note that the coe¢ cient on the participation dummy is negative, although not signicant.
Taking the point estimates at face value, however, this suggests that participation of (some) literate men
may reduce the size of government, possibly because this group of voters is likely to be relatively well-o¤
and thus not necessarily interested in more public spending and higher taxes.
24
system. The form of the education system feeds back into the societal structure. As
noted by Gilles and Verdier (1993) for example, publicly funded education encourages
accumulation of human capital and tends to produce a more even income distribution.
The pressures for redistribution generated by wider political participation may, therefore,
increase education spending and enrollment in schools. In particular, enfranchisement of
poor and illiterate citizens is likely to increase the demand for primary education, while
increased participation of the middle class is likely to increase mainly the demand for
secondary and tertiary education. Political competition, as discussed in section 2, tends
to promote e¢ cient policies and thus to encourage public investment in those types of
education with the highest social return.
While both the franchise rules and the restrictions on political competition in place
at a given point in time are likely to inuence public choices regarding education, Lipset
(1960) and other advocates of modernization theory have pointed out that accumulation of
human capital itself may be driving institutional development and cause democratization
in the longer run. This suggests a possible feedback loop that may bias our estimates
upwards. The possibility of a simultaneity bias should, therefore, be kept in mind when
interpreting our results.
Information on public spending on education is not available for a su¢ ciently long time
period to allow us to study spending on education. As an alternative, we test the hypoth-
esizes with data on enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary education expressed as
a percentage of the total population under 15 years of age.26 We estimate a panel model
similar to equation (1) with the same vector of political variable as in the previous section
and report the results in Table 5, regressions (17) to (19).
The results we present are broadly consistent with current theoretical conjectures.
Political competition has a positive impact on enrollment in primary education and no
(statistically signicant) e¤ect on enrollment in higher education. Microeconomic studies
typically nd that the social return to primary education is higher than the social return
to secondary and tertiary education. Accordingly, this nding is consistent with the notion
that political competition promotes e¢ cient policies.
26Enrollment rates are positively correlated with public spending on education.
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Political participation has a more complex a¤ect on enrollment rates than political
competition. Firstly, the participation dummy isolates the e¤ect of participation of lit-
erate men. We see that participation of this group reduces enrollment in primary and
increases enrollment in tertiary education. Since tertiary schooling in Latin America, as
elsewhere, is mainly for the children of the middle and upper classes, this is consistent
with Directors Law and more broadly with the notion that these groups demand public
support to the types of education that benet their o¤spring the most. Secondly, womens
su¤rage has a similar e¤ect: it is associated with higher enrollment rates in secondary and
tertiary education. This suggests that the enfranchisement of women mainly enhanced
the voting power of the middle class. This is consistent with survey evidence that elec-
toral participation increases with income (e.g., Norris, 2001) suggesting that it was mainly
"wealthier" women who went to vote. Thirdly, abolishment of literacy requirements in the
laws governing the franchise is positively associated with enrollment in primary education
and negatively associated with enrollment in secondary and tertiary education. Enroll-
ment in primary education may have expanded once literacy tests were abolished because
illiterate voters (and their children) need this type of education. And furthermore, because
the elites no longer needed to block investments in primary education as it no longer serves
the purpose of keeping to-be voters away from the polls. The demand for publicly funded
education that arises from the enfranchisement of illiterates is, therefore, directed at pri-
mary education, not at secondary and tertiary education which, as we mention above, tend
to benet mostly the middle and upper class.
The ndings are consistent with previous studies of the inuence of democracy on
education outcomes in Latin America. Brown (1999) reports evidence that democracy has
a positive e¤ect on primary school enrollment but its impact is most prominent among the
poorest democracies. Similarly, Brown and Hunter (2004), Avelino, Brown and Hunter
(2005) and Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) nd that democracy increases enrollment
in primary education and is positively correlated with overall real spending on education.
We contribute to this literature by demonstrating that the distinction between politi-
cal competition and participation is critical in any analysis of political institutions. The
distinction speaks to questions related to the overall size of government. In addition, in-
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cluding both political competition and participation into the analysis illuminates patterns
and processes in education. Finally, we show how the abolishment of literacy tests27 and
womens su¤rage had very di¤erent e¤ects on enrollment patterns.
5 Other Results
The regressions reported above contain a number of control variables which in themselves
are interesting determinants of scal choices and enrollment patterns. We briey comment
on some of them below.
1. Openness to trade is positively related to the size of government. This is consis-
tent with the insurance argument, advocated by Rodrik (1998), saying that public
spending plays the role of mitigating the social costs of international integration.
2. Equality (as measured by the percentage of the total area of cultivated land that is
owned by family farms) is negatively correlated with the size of government. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that the demand for redistribution is higher in more
equal societies. In addition, enrollment in primary education is negatively correlated
with equality, while enrollment in secondary and tertiary education is positively
related.
3. Population size is positively related to the size of the government and to enrollment
in primary education. This is consistent with increasing returns in the provision of
public services. The age structure, as captured by the fraction of the population
over 60 years of age, is also positively related to the size of the government, lending
support to the "grey power" hypothesis advocated by Lindert (1994).
4. The narrow version of Wagners law that the size of the government increases with
GDP per capita  receives little support from our regressions. In fact, GDP per
27Boix (2003) argues that the reduction of the electoral franchise through the creation of poll taxes,
literacy tests and property requirements that followed the removal of federal troops from the U.S. south
in the mid 1870s had signicant scal implications biasing the spending on education heavily against the
black population and the poor whites.
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capita is often negatively related to the size of the government. It is, however, likely
that the forces pushing for growth in government that Wagner (1883) pointed to are
better captured by urbanization. We note the urbanization rate is positively related
to both government spending and taxation, thus providing support for the broader
interpretation of Wagners law.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates the empirical relevance of the distinction between political
competition and participation, both with regard to the size of government and with regard
to enrollment in education. This nding has implications not only for our understanding
of the forces behind growth in government, but also more broadly for quantitative research
on political institutions.
Firstly, while in many contexts and for many research questions it may make sense to
construct composite indicators of democracy that combine aspects of participation with
aspects of competition (Przworsky, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000, Vanhanen, 2000
and 2003b; Boix, 2003), one should not overlook the fact that this may conceal important
insights because the constituent components can have o¤setting e¤ects. As pointed out
by Persson and Tabellini (2006), the devil may well be in the details.
Secondly, recent research within the political economics literature (e.g., Mulligan, Gil
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2004) tends to interpret the Polity IV
index as an index of democracy or changes in the index as a measure of democratization.
We have argued that the index is better interpreted as an index of political competition.
Political competition is surely one aspect of democracy, but most denitions would also
refer to some notion of participation (e.g., universal su¤rage) and civil liberties; thus there
is more to democracy than political competition.
A challenge for all empirical research on the link between political institutions and
scal outcomes is that of causality. In order to identify a causal e¤ect running from insti-
tutions to scal outcomes, the observed variations in the institutional arrangements must
be exogenous to the process that determines the scal outcomes. In practise, this often
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fails. One reason is that competition enhancing reforms and the extension of the franchise
might be driven by the same unobserved factors that determine scal choices. Another
reason is reverse causality: political reforms could be driven by scal considerations. In
the regression analysis, we control for a range of observable determinants of scal choices
and for country and year xed e¤ects. Yet, our estimates may not be causal. In partic-
ular, any time varying, unobserved factor that is correlated with political reforms would
bias the results. However, even if our results are not causal, we think that the strikingly
robust correlations between political competition, political participation, and the size of
government are of interest in their own right.
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7 Appendix
7.0.1 List of variables
 G=Y is Consolidated Central Government Expenditures in percentage of GDP (Y ).
 T=Y is Central Government Revenue in percentage of GDP (Y ).
 T income=Y is the tax revenue from incomes, prots and capital gains taxes as a
percentage of GDP (Y ).
 T commodity=Y is the revenue from taxes on domestic goods as a percentage of GDP
(Y ).
 T tariff=Y is the revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of GDP
(Y ).
 Soldiers per capita 16-59 is the number of soldiers as percentage of the population
aged between 16 and 59 years old. Constructed from military participation rates
(military population per 1000 inhabitants).
 Gdefense=Y is total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Y ).
 Enrollment in primary education is the total number of students in primary education
as percentage of the population under 15 years of age.
 Enrollment in secondary education is the total number of students in secondary
education as percentage of the population under 15 years of age.
 Enrollment in tertiary education is the total number of students in tertiary education
as percentage of the population under 15 years of age.
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 Competition dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 when the Polity
IV index is equal or less than zero and takes a value of 1 when the Polity IV index
is positive.
 Participation index is the voter turnout in each election as percentage of the total
population. In case of indirect elections, only votes cast in the nal election are
taken into account. If electors have not been elected by citizens, only the number
of actual electors is taken into account, which means that participation drops to 0.
If an election to choose electors has been held, participation is calculated from the
number and distribution of votes in that election. National referendums increase the
variable value by ve percent and state (regional) referendums by one percent for
the year they are held. Referendums can add to the degree of participation at most
by 30 percent in a given year. Combined participation cannot be higher than 70 per
cent, even in cases where the sum of participation and referendums would be higher
than 70 per cent.
 Participation dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the par-
ticipation index is positive and is 0 otherwise.
 Womens su¤rage is a dummy variable that takes the value of one after women were
granted the right to vote in societies with positive political participation (participa-
tion index>0).
 Literacy e¤ect is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the literacy restric-
tions on the right to vote were lifted in societies with positive political participation
(participation index>0) multiplied by the illiteracy rate (the total number of illiterate
adults divided by the total population).
 Economic Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in a country every
time a major economic crisis happens. As proxy of economic crisis, we use the dates
when a currency change takes place, specically the dummy is coded 1 two years
before a major currency change and one year after.
 GDP per capita is the logarithm of real GDP, PPP adjusted, divided by the total
population of the country.
 Growth is the yearly growth rate of GDP per capita.
 Ination is the percentage change in the consumer price index divided by 100.
 Income equality is proxied by family farms as a percentage of the total cultivated
area or the total area of farm holdings.
 Population is the natural logarithm of the total population of the country.
 Population under 15 is the percentage of the total population aged 15 or less.
 Population over 60 is the percentage of the total population aged 60 or more.
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 Urbanization rate is the percentage of the total population living in urban areas.
 Trade openness is exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP.
 War is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 when there is no war or civil
war and takes a value of 1 in the presence of a war or a civil war. In the sample,
the dummy war takes the value 1 for Nicaragua from 1978 to 1989 (Sandinistas
revolution) and for El Salvador from 1982 to 1991 (civil war).
Data sources Consolidated central government expenditures (G), central government
revenue (T ), tax revenue from incomes, prot and capital gains (T income), revenue from
taxes on domestic goods

T
commodity

, revenue from taxes on international trade
 
T tariff

,
total population, real and nominal GDP, enrollment in primary education, enrollment in
secondary education, enrollment in tertiary education, ination and Illiteracy rate, are
from the data web site of Department of Latin American studies, Oxford University, UK.
Population over 15 and Population over 60 are from Mitchell (1993). Military participa-
tion rate (to construct Soldiers per capita 16  59) and Total military expenditure as a
percentage of total GDP
 
Gdefense=Y

are from the Statistical abstract of Latin America,
various issues, University of California, Center of Latin American Studies. The participa-
tion index is from Vanhanen (2000, 2003b). Family Farms (Income equality) and urban
population out of total population (Urbanization rate) are from Vanhanen (2003a). The
source for the extension of the female franchise and the literacy restrictions are CEPAL
(1999), Nohlen (1993), and Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2001). Public education spending out
of GDP is from Cepal (Badeinso on-line database).
Construction of the data set For some control variables, there are gaps in the series.
We have dealt with this by linear interpolation. The Polity IV index codes regimes tran-
sitions with -88, foreign interruption with -66 and periods of anarchy with -77. In this
case, we follow the suggestions given in the Polity IV users manual (Marshall and Jaggers,
2000) and treat -66 as "system missing", -77 are converted to a polity score of 0 and cases
of transition (-88) are pro-rated across the span of the transition.
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Table 1: Total Government Spending (G/Y) and Revenue (T/Y) as a Percentage of 
Total GDP. Average per Decade. 
  1920-30 1930-40 
 
1940-50 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 
Argentina G/Y 
T/Y 
7.8 
6.4 
11.0 
8.7 
12.8 
8.2 
13.4 
8.7 
11.5 
9.0 
13.7 
10.2 
13.8 
12.0 
14.2 
13.2 
 
Bolivia G/Y 
T/Y 
    9.6 
6.6 
15.8 
9.6 
25.7 
7.6 
21.2 
16.0 
 
Brazil G/Y 
T/Y 
9.6 
8.2 
11.3 
9.2 
9.5 
8.6 
9.6 
7.6 
10.7 
7.5 
16.8 
9.9 
26.1 
22.8 
30.3 
24.6 
 
Chile G/Y 
T/Y 
  10.9 
10.3 
14.8 
12.9 
20.7 
17.2 
29.4 
28.3 
29.0 
27.6 
21.3 
22.5 
 
Colombia G/Y 
T/Y 
 5.9 
5.8 
7.8 
6.0 
7.9 
7.8 
9.0 
8.5 
11.5 
10.9 
14.3 
12.0 
14.6 
12.6 
 
Ecuador G/Y 
T/Y 
 
  9.3 
8.9 
9.0 
8.8 
12.6 
9.9 
12.9 
11.0 
14.6 
13.3 
16.9 
17.0 
Paraguay G/Y 
T/Y 
 
  6.4 
5.9 
7.1 
8.8 
9.3 
10.0 
11.2 
11.4 
9.8 
10.4 
12.5 
12.9 
Peru G/Y 
T/Y 
  13.3 
11.23 
13.8 
12.9 
16.6 
15.0 
19.4 
15.4 
14.2 
12.4 
18.4 
15.9 
 
Uruguay G/Y 
T/Y 
   10.8 
10.3 
14.1 
11.1 
22.0 
19.9 
25.1 
22.6 
28.9 
28 
 
Venezuela G/Y 
T/Y 
9.9 
10.0 
11.6 
11.4 
12.4 
13.0 
19.6 
19.7 
20 
20.6 
22.2 
27.0 
24.3 
25.2 
19.4 
19.5 
Costa Rica G/Y 
T/Y 
   10.8 
11.5 
13.7 
12.0 
19.3 
16.3 
23.7 
21.4 
22.0 
20.2 
 
Dominican G/Y 
T/Y 
   21.8 
20.8 
18.5 
16.4 
17.1 
16.1 
14.3 
12.5 
15.1 
15.4 
 
Guatemala G/Y 
T/Y 
7.0 
6.8 
12.3 
12.5 
10.9 
11.0 
9.4 
8.5 
9.3 
8.2 
11.0 
9.3 
12.2 
9.4 
9.9 
9.12 
 
Honduras G/Y 
T/Y 
7.8 7.4 6.9 12.3 11.7 16.0 
12.8 
23.1 
14.6 
23.3 
18.1 
 
Mexico G/Y 
T/Y 
5.9 
6.7 
6.6 
6.5 
8.0 
7.5 
10.0 
8.7 
 
11.8 
8.0 
13.8 
11.4 
25.0 
16.6 
15.8 
15.1 
Nicaragua G/Y 
T/Y 
   10.9 
10.1 
11.0 
10.4 
16.0 
13.1 
48.9 
30.7 
33.0 
25.0 
 
Panama G/Y 
T/Y 
  14.6 
12.8 
14.4 
13.3 
15.5 
13.5 
28.3 
20.8 
29.7 
25.6 
25.7 
26.1 
 
Salvador G/Y 
T/Y 
   7.5 
7.2 
12.5 
12.0 
12.3 
11.5 
14.5 
14.0 
18.1 
14.4 
 
Average  G/Y 
T/Y 
8.0    
7.6 
10.4     
  9.5 
10.4 
  9.5 
12.3 
11.5 
13.2 
    11.5 
17.2 
14.8 
21.7 
17.2 
 
19.7     
 17.9 
Source: Authors calculations. Total government spending (G), revenue (T) and GDP (Y) are from the 
Oxford Latin American Economic History Database.
Table 2: Political Competition, Participation and the Fiscal Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 G/Y 
 
T/Y Tincome/Y Tcommodity/Y Ttariff/Y G/Y 
 
T/Y Soldiers 
per capita aged  
16-59 
 
GDefence/Y 
Competition dummy -1.993 -1.655 0.145 -0.818 -0.376 -0.404 -0.633 -0.217 -2.596 
 (0.286)*** (0.242)*** (0.145) (0.263)*** (0.082)*** (0.543) (0.374)* (0.028)*** (0.914)*** 
Participation index 0.045 0.039 0.039 0.002 0.004 0.021 0.003 0.001 -0.021 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.026) 
Trade Openness 0.089 0.126 0.061 0.010 0.028 0.051 0.128 -0.000 -0.015 
 (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.009) (0.003)*** (0.019)*** (0.013)*** (0.001) (0.025) 
GDP per Capita -2.226 -0.874 0.520 1.959 -0.561 -7.104 -5.608 -0.512 3.211 
 (0.697)*** (0.719) (0.399) (0.827)** (0.159)*** (1.310)*** (0.988)*** (0.100)*** (3.016) 
Growth  3.356 1.213 -3.341 1.383 2.300 5.239 4.374 1.065 6.956 
 (2.135) (1.865) (1.627)** (1.648) (0.644)*** (4.159) (3.012) (0.269)*** (6.773) 
Income Equality -6.765 -4.560 -1.878 -0.092 3.578 -11.658 -3.512 -1.168 -18.191 
 (2.283)*** (1.641)*** (0.967)* (2.136) (0.557)*** (4.036)*** (2.561) (0.218)*** (5.260)*** 
Population 9.827 7.247 9.552 -1.353 2.008 10.450 7.496 0.163 18.347 
 (1.660)*** (1.263)*** (1.178)*** (1.913) (0.442)*** (3.214)*** (2.139)*** (0.137) (4.171)*** 
Population over 60 0.496 1.200 0.440 -0.553 0.214 1.909 2.555 0.026 2.368 
 (0.229)** (0.130)*** (0.092)*** (0.173)*** (0.050)*** (0.619)*** (0.326)*** (0.019) (0.846)*** 
Urbanization rate 0.071 0.121 0.112 -0.082 -0.023 -0.008 -0.088 -0.015 -0.424 
 (0.021)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.030)*** (0.008)*** (0.046) (0.027)*** (0.002)*** (0.087)*** 
Economics Crisis 2.257 0.160 -0.206 -0.489 -0.042 2.981 0.400 0.075 2.060 
 (0.592)*** (0.466) (0.168) (0.229)** (0.108) (0.737)*** (0.528) (0.031)** (0.895)** 
Inflation -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.009 
 (0.003)* (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)** (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)** 
War 9.153 5.014 0.279 1.091 -0.388 7.794 4.253 1.641 13.730 
 (1.134)*** (0.875)*** (0.497) (0.686) (0.214)* (1.322)*** (0.916)*** (0.117)*** (2.355)*** 
Trend 0.016 -0.121 -0.251 0.086 -0.066 -0.020 0.092 0.017 0.108 
 (0.055) (0.048)** (0.033)*** (0.038)** (0.013)*** (0.101) (0.069) (0.005)*** (0.129) 
Observations 1026 987 641 377 688 576 571 576 426 
# of countries 18 18 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and year fixed effects and we 
correct for autocorrelation of order 1.  
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Table 3: Interactions Between Political Competition and Participation. 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 G/Y 
 
T/Y Tincome/Y Tcommodity/Y Ttariff/Y 
Competition dummy -2.318 -1.445 -0.230 -0.748 -0.320 
 (0.433)*** (0.387)*** (0.195) (0.274)*** (0.112)*** 
Participation index 0.038 0.042 0.031 0.004 0.005 
 (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.012) (0.004) 
Interaction 0.018 -0.010 0.018 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.008)** (0.012) (0.005) 
Observations 1026 987 641 377 688 
# of countries 18 18 17 17 18 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. All regressions include country and year fixed effects and we correct for autocorrelation of order 
1. The control variables are the same as in Table 2. 
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Table 4: The Timing of Women's Suffrage and the Abolishment of Literacy Tests in the 18 
Countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: a=restrictions applied on a subset of regions. 
Sources: For Female Franchise: Economic Commission for Latino America and the Caribbean, UN: 
Participation and Leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean: Gender Indicators, December 1999. 
For Literacy tests: Nohlen (1993) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2001). 
 
 
 
 
Country Women’s suffrage 
introduced 
Literacy tests  
abolished 
Argentina 1947 1912a 
Bolivia 1952 1952 
Brazil 1932 1985 
Chile 1949 1970 
Colombia 1954 1936a 
Ecuador 1929 1978 
Paraguay 1961 1870 
Peru 1955 1979 
Uruguay 1932 1918 
Venezuela 1946 1947 
Costa Rica 1949 1913 
Dominican Republic 1942 1865 
El Salvador 1950 1945 
Guatemala 1946 1946 
Honduras 1955 1894 
Mexico 1953 1857 
Nicaragua 1955 1893 
Panama 1945 1904 
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Table 5: Literacy Tests, Women's Suffrage, The Size of Government and Enrollments in Education 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 G/Y T/Y Enrollment 
in  
Primary  
Education 
 
Enrollment 
in 
Secondary  
Education 
 
Enrollment 
in 
Tertiary  
Education 
 
Competition dummy -1.400 -1.167 1.138 -0.002 0.115 
 (0.301)*** (0.256)*** (0.281)*** (0.110) (0.045)** 
Participation dummy -0.791 -0.622 -0.744 -0.124 0.138 
 (0.592) (0.557) (0.601) (0.182) (0.083)* 
Women’s suffrage 0.269 -0.103 -0.756 1.341 0.459 
 (0.462) (0.413) (0.405)* (0.139)*** (0.080)*** 
Literacy effect 0.031 0.047 0.050 -0.034 -0.022 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Trade openness 0.092 0.130 -0.041 0.075 -0.013 
 (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP per Capita -1.976 -0.746 6.047 1.337 -0.269 
 (0.691)*** (0.701) (0.723)*** (0.234)*** (0.101)*** 
Growth  2.936 0.717 -5.165 -0.886 0.460 
 (2.129) (1.862) (1.517)*** (0.662) (0.280)* 
Income Equality -3.898 -0.921 -0.738 17.979 6.092 
 (2.358)* (1.650) (1.611) (0.951)*** (0.362)*** 
Population 11.106 8.826 15.577 -8.616 -7.975 
 (1.742)*** (1.311)*** (0.672)*** (0.533)*** (0.260)*** 
Population over 60 0.684 1.382    
 (0.231)*** (0.134)***    
Population under 15   0.140 -0.077 -0.105 
   (0.069)** (0.025)*** (0.010)*** 
Urbanization rate 0.071 0.116 0.234 0.174 0.076 
 (0.021)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** 
Economics Crisis 2.125 -0.015 0.890 0.732 -0.145 
 (0.591)*** (0.455) (0.521)* (0.172)*** (0.054)*** 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.001    
 (0.003)* (0.001)    
War 9.235 5.347 3.158 -1.014 0.571 
 (1.149)*** (0.887)*** (0.469)*** (0.221)*** (0.076)*** 
Trend -0.026 -0.159 -0.160 0.180 0.164 
 (0.059) (0.050)*** (0.048)*** (0.017)*** (0.007)*** 
Observations 1026 987 1012 991 682 
# of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include country and year fixed effects and we correct for autocorrelation of order 1. 
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Figure 1: Classification of Political Regimes in Two Dimensions: Competition and 
Participation. 
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Figure 2: Scatter Plot of the Normalized Polity IV [0,1] and the Participation Index.  
 
 
  Source: Authors calculations. 
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Figure 3: The Normalized Polity IV [0,1] and the Participation Index between 1900-
2000, in Three Selected Countries.  
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           Source: Authors calculations. 
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Figure 4: The Size of the Government (G/Y and T/Y) between 1920-2000, Distinguished by 
the Degree of Political Participation and Competition. 
(A) (B) 
(C) 
 
(D) 
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Note: A country is defined as having high electoral participation when the participation index 
is larger than 15 percent. A country is defined as having low electoral participation when the 
participation index is less than 15 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
